Episode 20

The Moral Argument for God‘s Existence (with Dr. Justin Gash)

What does our notions of right and wrong tell us about the existence of God?

In this episode Dr. Justin Gash of Franklin College joins us to tackle this fascinating question. We discuss the moral argument for God's existence, describe how it is usually countered, and then analyze those counter-arguments.

In the end we each give our take on how effective this argument is in achieving various goals.

Transcript
Speaker:

Well, hello again, welcome back.

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Dr.

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Justin gash.

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We are excited to have you back on,

we're going to explore a little bit

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about the more argument, because you

mentioned in the last episode at the

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end of it, that that's, the argument

from William Lane, Craig, his book,

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reasonable faith that has most.

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Resonated with you.

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so I was wondering if you could.

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Walk us through what that is off the bat.

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We can kind of discuss it.

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And then maybe toward the end, we can,

we can hear kind of more your, your

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experience of how you're interacting

with that and why you find it helpful

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and compelling Sure absolutely.

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So the moral argument, consistent

to premises and in conclusion,

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the first premise is that.

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If there is no, God.

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Objective moral values and duties.

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Don't exist.

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Another way to phrase that, then

I think sometimes it's helpful.

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Is objective moral values and

duties exist only if God exists.

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the second premise is that objective

moral values and duties do exist.

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And Therefore God exists.

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All right.

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Nice cogent argument.

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A only at B.

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Exists, therefore B is B exists.

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That's exactly right.

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, wait.

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The question there is.

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what if there are no objective

morals and duties, right.

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So that's what the second premise.

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As to address is that.

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Those objective moral values

and duties do in fact exist.

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Uh, premise one is looking more.

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at.

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Who or what could lay.

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Such obligations upon us.

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and What I find fascinating.

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About, both the, the.

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Philosophical naturalism, which

would be a prominent worldview.

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For atheists.

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and.

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Western theists is that.

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Everyone seems to be on board.

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With that premise, there are

exceptions, and I'm happy to

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discuss that if you would like.

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But the, so you're saying premise to.

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That objective moral standards

and obligations exist.

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You say most people would concede that?

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no.

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I'm referring to the first one.

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I see.

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Uh, that, um, the premise one

that objective moral values

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and duties exist only if.

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God exists.

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Okay.

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The primary critique, loving

by an atheist worldview.

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More philosophical mantra list worldview.

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Would be against the reality of there

being objective, moral values and duties.

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Most of the prominent.

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atheists would suggest that.

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the ones that I've ran,

what, what in fact say that?

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Yeah.

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If there are objective moral

values and duties that.

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Uh, who or what would lay in this upon us?

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it would be gone.

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Um, I see.

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So, sounds like the key

word there is objective.

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Objective is a key word.

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Can you help us describe the difference

between objectivity or objective

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morals and subjective morals?

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So subjective morals certainly exist.

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And subjective morals

are the set of morals.

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That are dependent upon the

subject doing the analysis.

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So for example, I have.

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Uh, moral code.

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That that would be my subjective morality.

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It's far from clear that

my subjective morality is.

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The objective morality I'm aiming for.

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But we all have a subjective morality.

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And some objective morality.

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Shift over time.

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For example, it would probably be,

A good assumption to make that we,

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the faculty of Franklin college.

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Hope.

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That the.

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Ethical understanding of our students.

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Improves after four years

of study as a pros to.

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degenerating.

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I need to be careful cause I just.

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The fact that you can even

improve, implies that there's

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a direction we're going right.

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Okay, but the point is is that we

each have our own subjective morality.

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and certainly it changes.

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So that's like I have a moral code.

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You have a moral code?

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Ours are different.

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Um, can we say that one is necessarily

better or worse than the other?

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Maybe that's same, same kind of

thing comparison here, but they

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just can be different and can.

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Yes.

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Objective would mean that

it, there is one code.

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It is.

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The code.

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Yeah, objective.

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Moral values and duties are

independent of the subject.

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That is assessing them.

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So.

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We might say.

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Historically speaking.

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That.

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There have been cultures in the world.

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That.

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Thought I'm thinking of something that

we would consider abominable today.

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Pillaging communities.

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To take the resources or how about

the Spartan two exposed babies?

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Yes.

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Sense of exposing them

to the elements to die.

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Yes, that's right up there for me.

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I can't imagine that.

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Yeah.

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And it's also right up there for me,

because for those of you who can't see me

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on the podcast, which would be all of you.

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I am an.

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I have a disability.

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And so I'm quite certain in Sparta and

they wouldn't just throw me in the pit.

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Uh, yea for 20th century America.

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I had thought of that, Dustin.

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but that's a great one, right?

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I mean, so their subjective view was that.

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then it was okay to do that.

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There was no ethical call.

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There was no ethical qualm about that.

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Our subjective view and modern day.

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America is that that there's

absolutely something wrong.

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The question is.

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Is there an objective?

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Reason.

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To think that that is actually wrong.

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That is.

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it's not just because we decide

that we don't like it anymore,

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but whether it is actually.

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Morally objectionable.

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To expose babies.

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So, is there a transcendent.

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Objective.

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Moral code.

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That's not just based on the

sociopolitical structures of a given.

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Community in time.

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Correct.

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And, or an individual or an

individual, an individual that's right.

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And.

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You've just hinted at.

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Y most philosophical naturalists,

again, I want to say most.

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And that's most that I'm familiar with.

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It's definitely not all.

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And I can provide examples.

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But many would subscribe to the, to

this point, to this claim, because if

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it's not a transcendent moral source,

that's laying these duties upon us.

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What would be the source and

really the only the most popular.

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Alternative would be a

version of Platonism, wench.

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I can not speak well enough about.

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Two.

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be speaking to it on this podcast,

but is not terribly popular.

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In terms of, moral and ethical.

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Uh, obligation.

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I don't think can I, Pass

this question, Daniel then?

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Yes.

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Okay.

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I don't know if that's okay.

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Perhaps pastor Dan has a better way of.

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Uh, I may not have been doing a very

good job of walking in the moral.

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I think he's been really good

and helpful so far and clear.

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I think, uh, so the question is.

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if objective morals aren't.

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transcendent by somebody or

some person, something that.

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Instills them.

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Is there another place?

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Where they could be found.

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What, what do you think Daniel?

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I think it's tricky.

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I think any answer that.

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Philosophers have given, have not proven.

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Satisfactory to.

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Uh, many other philosophers.

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So you get Plato as an example,

caught, also believed in.

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absolute moral duties in a

sense, but the ground that both

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of them gave were based upon.

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they're all speculative metaphysics.

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And unless you buy into that,

which most people don't.

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Then you have no ground for that.

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so there can't be

objections to premise one.

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Folks like Plato and cons have

given them, but they aren't really.

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Widely accepted maybe.

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I don't think for most people

they're viable options.

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Okay.

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Again, Do your mileage may vary, but.

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I don't know.

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Anybody who would subscribe to Plato's

theory of forms today as he put it forth.

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And then view that as a, as

a basis for ethical duties or

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an objective morality, Okay.

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Okay.

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Thanks.

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So back to objective and subjective.

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other thoughts on those

to help us understand.

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Yeah.

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Yeah, one thing that might be

helpful for later and can also be an

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illustration now would be considering.

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scientific claims that we

would, we would view as.

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Objective.

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So consider the eclipse because we just.

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Had one.

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All right.

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It's absolutely true that some cultures.

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I have viewed The eclipse

as a harbinger of doom.

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or given it's.

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Special metaphysical, meaning.

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but.

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Objectively.

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We know that that is not the case,

From a scientific point of view.

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It's the moon.

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passing in front of us and the sun.

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That's that's what it is.

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So they may have had a subjective

view and you can still say our view

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is subjective, but I think most of us

would, say that that's an objective view.

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Let's put it this way.

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If that isn't sufficient to be objective.

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I don't know a context that exists.

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Where we could use the word.

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Objective in a meaningful way.

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at some point.

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We have sufficient evidence to

suggest that regardless of what

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your views are, this is reality.

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Um, and so in science, we wouldn't

say that it's an objectively true.

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At the moon passes in front of the sun.

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And even though historically different

cultures viewed them differently.

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Or may have anthropomorphized

the sun and the moon.

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It's still actually the case

that in their time, the moon was

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just passing in front of the sun.

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Yeah.

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I want to clarify here.

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So.

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You're not saying the scientific

arguments and moral judgments are equal,

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but you're illustrating the difference

between objectivity and subjectivity.

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For both of these areas.

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That is correct.

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That is correct.

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So the premise there is that moral

objective, morals and duties.

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Exists only if.

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God exists.

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So what's the connection between objective

morals and duties and God's existence.

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that's an interesting question.

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And I guess I would think about who

are, what the candidates would be.

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For us to have objective moral values.

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Meaning that there are things that are

objectively good and objectively evil.

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And objective moral duties, meaning

there's things that we ought to do

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and things that we ought not to do.

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There has to be something or some body.

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Laying those requirements on us.

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What candidates are there?

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naturalism.

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Offers.

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No.

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Sources for objective.

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Moral values and duties.

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It is amoral buy-ins finds very construct.

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Not immoral.

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Not immoral amoral.

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So you've never been in a science

class where they've talked

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about the, generosity molecule.

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And how it operates.

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and we take in the generosity

molecule, and now we are obligated.

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To be generous, but I have heard of

the happiness hormone of dopamine.

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Indeed.

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Happiness.

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Isn't a moral.

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virtue though.

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So there can be physiological

effects that can help.

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Is it not.

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I don't think so, but anyway, I think.

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The way I've heard this summarized

is that you cannot get is that

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you cannot get odd from is yes.

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That would be a fair summary.

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Yeah.

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From the bare fact.

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That the universe exists.

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Doesn't give you.

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Any basis for saying, what should

that happen within this universe?

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That's correct.

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so the naturalistic perspective says.

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We're here this happened, but it

doesn't really provide a good argument

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for the existence of objective morals.

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So most naturalists.

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There qualm wouldn't be with.

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Premise one, it'd be a premise two.

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They'd say, well, we don't believe that.

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Objective morals and

duties actually exist.

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is that right?

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for most, that would be my take.

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Yes.

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. Well, let's talk about premise to

then, because you said this is where

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most of the intellectual action is.

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So.

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Why is that true?

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And what are the arguments against it?

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I think the best argument.

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That it exists.

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And certainly the argument

that William Lane Craig.

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would put his weight behind

is that we have a rational.

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Basis.

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For experiencing the world around us and

trusting the experiences that we have.

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And that.

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Notions of.

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Injustice and immorality.

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Or goodness.

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Our inherent that we can observe.

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What's right.

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And good.

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In the same way, we can observe that we

are speaking into microphones right now.

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Objections that.

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Might fall under the same,

same, uh, objections, emphasis.

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If someone said, well, how

do we know we're speaking

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into a microphone right now?

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Maybe it's an illusion.

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Maybe everything is.

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organizing itself in a way

around us to delude ourselves.

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Uh, so I think.

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Natural experience for most folks.

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Is that they do see moral values and

moral duties in the world around them.

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For example.

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Uh, and I'm going to speak,

I'm going to give an example.

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That's.

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Ruff.

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and not highly contextual.

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Just to make the point.

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We would say that.

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Child abuse.

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Is wrong.

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Or I, at least I claim that I claimed

that child abuse is actually wrong.

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I appreciate that other people.

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And other cultures may

not have always agreed.

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With that, and that sexual abuse

may have taken place or that

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physical abuse may have taken place.

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But they were wrong in

the exact same sense.

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That they were wrong about the moon

chasing down the sun during the eclipse.

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That actually child abuse.

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Physical sexual emotional is wrong.

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To negate the premise.

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That objective moral

values and duties do exist.

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To negate that you were

saying, there are no.

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Objective moral values or duties.

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So the counterclaim is that.

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There are no objective moral

values and duties anywhere.

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At all.

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and so to me, that would

be my affirmative argument.

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For the case that objective

moral values and duties do exist.

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in our reality, we experienced

that they do in fact exist.

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And that seems to be.

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The universal reaction

that people have, right.

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When I say child abuse is wrong.

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I'm not just saying I don't like it.

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I'm not just saying, well, it's, it's

wrong for us at the American culture, but

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say in China or Nigeria, It'd be fine.

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I making an objective statement

that this is fundamentally wrong.

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And we all do that.

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We all criticize other people's

choices and decisions, and often

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our own, hopefully on the basis

that some things are simply right.

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It's simply wrong.

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Not that they're human preference.

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So that speaks to the objectivity.

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of these claims.

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When you say that this is wrong

and it's always wrong, it doesn't

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matter if it's been prosecuted.

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And other times in cultures doesn't matter

because it's, it's objectively wrong.

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Like it's not a product of us

being here in this time and place

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Yeah, I think this is very important.

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for us understanding.

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Uh,

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history.

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And putting things where

they, Properly ought to go.

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So.

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In thinking about world war two.

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And the Holocaust.

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To say that it's something's

objectively wrong is to say that.

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Even if if the Nazis had won.

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And then taken over the world

and they had brainwashed everyone

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through an education program.

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That it was good and right to murder.

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Jewish people.

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eradicate them.

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It still wouldn't actually be right.

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It's actually wrong.

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this is important when we analyze

history, because I think about

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American's own history with slavery.

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if the argument is that there are no

objective moral values and duties.

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Then when I say slavery is wrong.

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I'm really just stating an opinion.

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And I mean, how much more

important is my opinion in.

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A slave owner's opinion, right?

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And who is to adjudicate

between those two opinions.

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And is it, majority rules?

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That it was right when it was

happening because it was legal.

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that seems like some dangerous thinking.

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it seems like it's dangerous

thinking and whatever term,

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how are we would define morals?

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It doesn't seem like that's a

natural definition for what we mean

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when we're talking about morality.

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at all, because we can come up with

a Legion of counterexamples where.

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people or cultures.

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Including modern day American culture.

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Are behaving in ways that upon review

probably aren't good, even though

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they are popular or were popular.

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the point being here that, when we have

these objective moral values and duties,

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we are not, we're distinguishing them from

the subjective whims of the individual.

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Or a society.

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And we're, saying that they're set apart.

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And I think that's important for

analyzing history appropriately.

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So Daniel, can you help us understand

then, if we've got something

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called objective morality, how

does the subjective morality.

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I relate to that.

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cause I think that there are

certain things like our moral

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code here is different than

the moral code of Nazi Germany.

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Are they both equally valid or what's

the interplay between the subjective.

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And the objective.

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Yeah, fair question.

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Um, I'd love to get justice take on

this too, because he might have a.

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More informed with awful take.

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But for me, I would say.

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We all have a subjective morality,

like Justin just mentioned.

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we may not articulate it, but the

very fact that we make moral choices

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and very often make consistent

types of moral choices indicates

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that we have a subject to morality.

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No.

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That's not wrong.

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we should have this objective morality.

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But the question is not

whether that's right or wrong.

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But whether there's some standard that

the should ultimately conform to or not.

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If it's simply subjective in the sense

that no one is able to criticize it.

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There is no one who could

adjudicate, whether mind.

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Is better than someone else's,

even if they have opposite values.

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that's the deeper question.

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I'm not sure if that's

what you're asking in that.

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Okay.

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Justin, did you have a take on that?

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I concur with your tank.

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And I think.

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Always a good idea.

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Yeah.

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That's why, that's why I do it.

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And it's part of my moral,

subjective, moral code Daniel.

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Uh, I agree.

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And I think, the question

is Does our subjective.

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Moral codes.

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isn't working to approximate an

actual true objective morality.

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You know, so when people say, Look

at all the progress we've made.

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And they're talking about

ethics, What they're saying?

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Isn't that more perfect.

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Just saying that we are imperfect,

but we're aiming somewhere.

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we have a target in mind?

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If there's no target in mind, there's

no measurable way of discerning.

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Right or wrong is just.

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Different moral views in

a, space with no direction.

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Yeah.

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I'm also reminded of the fact that

in France, There is within a vault.

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An iron rod.

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That's exactly one meter long.

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And they.

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Taking the barrier's pains to

make sure that it is the standard.

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So Justin and I say, we're both working on

a house or working on a building together.

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And I have.

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My idea of what a meter should be.

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:

And we're making all these measurements

and buying all this material.

474

:

Putting the things together based on that.

475

:

And he has a different one.

476

:

Well, the question is, is there a standard

that we can both appeal to, to see.

477

:

Okay.

478

:

Which one of us has that to a right.

479

:

And let me pick up on that.

480

:

One question.

481

:

I think you could ask the one who

would label themselves or progressive

482

:

is, What are we to progress?

483

:

Towards.

484

:

What is the end goal?

485

:

Is there some final state of

what society should look like?

486

:

That is the standard.

487

:

For whether we're progressing

there or regressing.

488

:

There's a standard for motivating

our actions towards that.

489

:

And then related to that.

490

:

Okay.

491

:

Why that goal is to have another.

492

:

My point, being that when we had

this idea of progress, That implies

493

:

that there is this universal.

494

:

State that we should be working towards.

495

:

Which has universal object to

moral goodness towards it in it.

496

:

Uh, towards it or in it.

497

:

So anyway, that's my 2 cents.

498

:

And if you want that for other

cultures or communities as well.

499

:

that seems to hint at some sort of.

500

:

Objectivity.

501

:

Right.

502

:

So if, if we think that slavery is bad,

not just in this culture, but also.

503

:

In the Caribbean.

504

:

And in, Latin America, other places.

505

:

that seems to me that

it's pointing toward.

506

:

Okay.

507

:

It's not just because I was

born to this place in assumed

508

:

these cultural values it's that?

509

:

No, that actually transcends

the cultural values.

510

:

Right.

511

:

We want this, not just because

it's our personal opinion that.

512

:

And the desire for ourselves,

but because we view it.

513

:

As an object will be

better state of society.

514

:

So it seems to me that.

515

:

Well, I like what you said at the

beginning that subjective morals are true.

516

:

It's not that there are no subjective

morals that this argument argues about.

517

:

Objective morals.

518

:

Everybody has their own

thoughts on what's right.

519

:

And what's wrong in a given situation.

520

:

But to be moral subjectivists we

really can't have any grounds for.

521

:

Trying to impose that on somebody else.

522

:

Can we.

523

:

I mean, it's just, this is right for me.

524

:

that's moral relativism, which.

525

:

On a society level in a global

economy is going to just.

526

:

Be dangerous.

527

:

I would agree.

528

:

And to use your language from the podcast.

529

:

I think it's also just an unlivable.

530

:

I think that's an unlivable philosophy.

531

:

That folks who.

532

:

Purport to believe that don't

actually live out because there are.

533

:

Right and wrong things.

534

:

And we behave as Dan mentioned.

535

:

As if there are really wrong things

to do and really right things to do.

536

:

All the time.

537

:

it just seems to me that.

538

:

If I'm ever upset that you did

something wrong against me.

539

:

So you cut me off in traffic.

540

:

I mean, well, that's wrong for me?

541

:

But it might not be wrong for you.

542

:

Which really means that.

543

:

I have no valid reason to

even be upset with you.

544

:

Isn't that?

545

:

Well, there's no basis.

546

:

There's just no basis to

make a moral judgment.

547

:

Other than it's just, well,

this is what the law is.

548

:

So.

549

:

You can have descriptive statements.

550

:

Like I felt angry.

551

:

but, The point raised previously.

552

:

that doesn't take an is to an aunt, right.

553

:

And you are angry and does not mean that.

554

:

You ought to be angry.

555

:

Or that, they ought to have

done something differently.

556

:

It's just a statement of, emotion.

557

:

perhaps I might add What I think

is the biggest attack against

558

:

that premise because We are all.

559

:

Well, we all believe in God.

560

:

So we, we are.

561

:

We, we front load in the argument, uh,

in for, for us, there is absolutely

562

:

an objective moral standard in that.

563

:

That standard is gone, but let's

say that we were arguing from

564

:

an apologetic point of view.

565

:

And we want God to be on the backend of

the argument as a result of the syllogism.

566

:

Right.

567

:

So I would say the most

prominent rebuttal.

568

:

On grounds and philosophical

naturalism would be that.

569

:

There is.

570

:

And I'm paraphrasing.

571

:

Um,

572

:

Oh, excuse me.

573

:

I forgot his name.

574

:

Evolutionary biologists.

575

:

Okay, thank you.

576

:

Yeah.

577

:

to paraphrase Richard

Dawkins, that there is.

578

:

at base, no good, no evil, no, right.

579

:

No wrong.

580

:

Just cold pitiless, indifference.

581

:

We are machines for propagating DNA.

582

:

That is all.

583

:

we're all here through unguided.

584

:

natural selection and evolution.

585

:

There is no grand design.

586

:

Everything we perceive as moral

values and duties is really just.

587

:

Socio biological, perhaps

psychological evolution at play.

588

:

And so we can't trust.

589

:

That that any of our

perceptions have any real value.

590

:

They're just accidents.

591

:

I think that would be.

592

:

The most prominent counter-argument.

593

:

Th the moral argument.

594

:

As one might imagine I can

review the rebuttals to that.

595

:

attack.

596

:

Well,

597

:

I really like the way William Lane, Craig

outlines this because he makes, I'm going

598

:

to take a little bit of a diversion here,

but I want to make it clear when you say.

599

:

That somebody is wrong or that.

600

:

That you do not subscribe

to a particular belief.

601

:

There are two ways you can mean that

first is that you just outright.

602

:

Don't think the belief is correct.

603

:

So you can just say, no,

I think you're wrong.

604

:

But the second way you can deny belief

in something is to say I don't have

605

:

sufficient cause to believe in it.

606

:

You're not claiming it's wrong.

607

:

But I need reason.

608

:

To believe in this to be right.

609

:

I need one philosophers called warrant.

610

:

Uh, so the first one you can take that

critique that we are all products.

611

:

Socio biological evolution.

612

:

when being an, an attack on The truth.

613

:

Of the statement, objective,

moral values and duties do exist.

614

:

But.

615

:

That would be an example

of genetic fallacy, which

616

:

would be to blame the source.

617

:

to look at the source of

our understanding and then.

618

:

Declare the claim false.

619

:

Even if.

620

:

socio biological evolution is the

source of our moral understanding.

621

:

That doesn't actually demonstrate that.

622

:

Objective moral values and duties.

623

:

Don't exist.

624

:

That's just, a quibble with the source

from which we get that knowledge from.

625

:

What I think is more likely is the

second attack, which is to say.

626

:

Because of socio biological evolution.

627

:

All of our thoughts and our, brains.

628

:

Are.

629

:

The result of accidental

unguided processes.

630

:

And therefore we can't.

631

:

Trust.

632

:

Our moral understanding

because on what basis would we.

633

:

I think I've heard both of you

mentioned before Steven Pinker.

634

:

had a book that he

released in the nineties.

635

:

how the mind works, how the mind works.

636

:

Thank you.

637

:

And.

638

:

I think the quote is that our brains

aren't organs that have developed

639

:

through biological evolution.

640

:

They are not.

641

:

Tunnel's too.

642

:

truth.

643

:

We are organisms, not angels.

644

:

We have been shaped by

natural selection alone.

645

:

To solve life and death problems, not

to commune with correctness or answer

646

:

any question that can be answered.

647

:

That.

648

:

That's exactly what I was going to say.

649

:

If I was as informed and

well-versed as, as Daniel.

650

:

For some reason that's always stuck

with me because it seems to have

651

:

self-contradictory he's making the

whole point that our minds can't.

652

:

Make true statements about anything.

653

:

maybe a separate, immediate

sense of reception.

654

:

But that statement itself is the kind

of claim that he's just undermining.

655

:

So he's saying our minds

are made to work like that.

656

:

His own mind wasn't

made to work like that.

657

:

Is that correct?

658

:

That is correct.

659

:

And it's interesting.

660

:

And I think that is the,

the main rebuttal to that.

661

:

And then that what's good for

the goose is good for the Gander.

662

:

What you can't say.

663

:

It's not intellectually consistent.

664

:

To say.

665

:

Well, our minds have developed

through sociobiological

666

:

evolution, which is unguided.

667

:

Therefore we can't trust their perceptions

about objective morality on those grounds.

668

:

You can't trust the

perceptions on anything.

669

:

Uh, including the statement

that our minds are.

670

:

Developed by.

671

:

Yeah, that's right.

672

:

So it is, it is self-defeating.

673

:

but.

674

:

Can I tell I'm going to

tack on one more thing here.

675

:

And I apologize if

taking up too much time.

676

:

Okay.

677

:

This is a newer thought

that I've had recently.

678

:

And so I I'd like to hear your thoughts

on it, but I mentioned earlier about

679

:

how I don't think it's actually livable.

680

:

To believe that there are no

objective moral values or duties.

681

:

And I wanted to use, how the mind works.

682

:

Steven Pinker's taxed As an illustration.

683

:

We just covered how, the statement

that he makes then that Dan.

684

:

Quoted.

685

:

Is self-defeating.

686

:

But you also have to ask the question.

687

:

Why would someone who believes

that write a nonfiction book?

688

:

If there's.

689

:

You know, telling us the truth

about how our minds work.

690

:

Based upon.

691

:

faulty mine putting

that forth as Oak to me.

692

:

And then trusting that the

people who are reading the book

693

:

will gain something from it.

694

:

Presumably.

695

:

What they're gaining is truth.

696

:

I would think.

697

:

My point being is that.

698

:

The XPLAN the best explanation, I think.

699

:

And I'm not as bright as Steven

Pinker and I'm picking on him and

700

:

I, don't intend it in any kind of

mean-spirited way, but I think the

701

:

best explanation for that is to say,

702

:

That isn't actually what he

believes he can state it.

703

:

But his whole life is one giant

counterexample to the statement,

704

:

he actually is a professor.

705

:

And he does believe he can transmit truth.

706

:

He's been his entire vocation.

707

:

I spent transmitting truth.

708

:

The fact that it's in a book.

709

:

Means he thinks that he can transmit

truth to people and that they can read it.

710

:

And incorporate it.

711

:

And presumably then it

has some sort of impact.

712

:

I'm a little far afield here, but

I think that is a direct analogy to

713

:

what it means to not believe in any

objective moral values and duties.

714

:

I think people can state that.

715

:

But in the end, they're going to walk

away from the discussion table where

716

:

they just send that and they're going

to live their entire life as if.

717

:

There are moral values and duties that

they expect to be Upheld and that.

718

:

They will find it unreasonable

if people are not doing it.

719

:

If they're not doing what they say

and they're dishonest or they steal.

720

:

or if they hurt others

without proper cause.

721

:

does that make sense?

722

:

Yeah.

723

:

Very much so.

724

:

So we got to wrap up here pretty soon.

725

:

But at the beginning, you said this was

the argument that you found most helpful

726

:

or at least resonated with you the most.

727

:

Why.

728

:

I think it's the most personal

of the apologetics arguments and.

729

:

ultimately it's about connecting.

730

:

Connecting with God.

731

:

The other arguments are very good.

732

:

Certainly from the Calum

cosmological argument, you can infer.

733

:

Uh, creator.

734

:

And you can infer a personal choice.

735

:

Same with the tele illogical argument.

736

:

You say there's a designer

would be to say that there is a

737

:

personal agent making choices.

738

:

But moral argument.

739

:

is not only about God's objective

standards for ought to be done.

740

:

It's about my ability.

741

:

To meet those standards.

742

:

And in the case of Christianity, that

realization that I objectively failed

743

:

to meet those objective standards.

744

:

And am in desperate need of.

745

:

Salvation through Jesus

redeeming sacrifice.

746

:

And it's also a growth

mindset opportunity.

747

:

Like I have somewhere to go every day.

748

:

I can look at my life and I can say.

749

:

I can ask.

750

:

Did I meet the goal?

751

:

And again, it inevitably the question

is I didn't, but that's not really

752

:

the point asking the question.

753

:

The point question is where

didn't I meet the goal.

754

:

And how do I do it?

755

:

Better the next time.

756

:

And so.

757

:

There's this aspirational.

758

:

Component.

759

:

To it.

760

:

but I don't know What are your

thoughts about the moral argument?

761

:

, do you find a compelling.

762

:

I do.

763

:

I think anyone can choose

to deny the second premise,

764

:

especially if they want to.

765

:

But as you said, To do that.

766

:

With the consistency and livability.

767

:

I think most people when they

sit down and think about it,

768

:

like, yeah, I can't go there.

769

:

I can't.

770

:

Deny that some things are

objectively right and wrong.

771

:

And I think that's a good clue.

772

:

It's a good sign.

773

:

It's not approved like a.

774

:

Algebraic proof or something like that.

775

:

But it's a good sign.

776

:

So that's my take.

777

:

What?

778

:

Nathan.

779

:

I think it's good.

780

:

not only because it points to God's

existence, but it points to the

781

:

character of God and it points to how.

782

:

We see God as good.

783

:

Like, Freedom is good.

784

:

That's because that,

attribute actually originated.

785

:

In.

786

:

God.

787

:

Who says he created us in his image.

788

:

And so we, actually

inherit that attribute.

789

:

Same thing with generosity

or kindness or love or grace.

790

:

Or peace.

791

:

these are things that we look at

and we think, okay, those are good.

792

:

I want to.

793

:

experience those and to see

that those are grounded in.

794

:

God, it's really meaningful.

795

:

Because as you mentioned, kind

of waking up each day and looking

796

:

at, how you lived up to that.

797

:

Standard.

798

:

You know, some people can take that and.

799

:

And feel OCD about or something.

800

:

And I think that that's, not

the best response to that.

801

:

I think the response to what you said is.

802

:

Implicit there is, as I align my life

to that objective moral standard,

803

:

which is the character of God.

804

:

My life actually.

805

:

Takes on, uh, better quality

for me and the people around me.

806

:

And that's a good thing and that's,

that's the place I want to be.

807

:

And I don't think people

really argue with that.

808

:

You know, I want to be a good

person because I just feel

809

:

like that's the right way.

810

:

And that's better for

the people around me.

811

:

Does that point to the existence of God?

812

:

And I think the moral

argument shows that it does.

813

:

Thank you very much, Justin, did you have

anything else you want to talk about?

814

:

no, I just wanted thank you all

for the opportunity to be on the

815

:

podcast and, uh, you'll get our bill.

816

:

darn it.

817

:

I thought I was, I thought I was getting.

818

:

I thought I was getting paid.

819

:

We do things backward to.

820

:

Well, thanks so much for joining us.

821

:

Yeah.

822

:

Yeah.

823

:

It's been great.

824

:

You're welcome.

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